Diagnosis.
The HS2 debacle
- Original 2010 estimate: £32bn for full network
- Current cost (Phase 1 only): £67bn+, still rising
- Northern leg (Phase 2) cancelled by Sunak 2023
- Euston terminus still uncertain
- Consultancy and management layers have absorbed enormous sums with poor accountability
- Project management has been captured by legal and contract complexity rather than engineering delivery
Broader transport context
- Road network in visible decline (potholes as political symbol)
- Rail: newly renationalised under Labour 2024 plan, transition still in progress
- Buses: outside London, in long decline, with genuine network collapse in many regions
- Ports and freight: Brexit friction reduced, infrastructure still inadequate
- Aviation: Heathrow third runway decision overdue; regional airport investment neglected
- Cycling and walking: under-invested compared to European peers
- EV transition: mandates set, infrastructure lagging, UK auto industry under strain
Core Policy Platform.
HS2: Complete What Started, Audit What Happened.
Position: Complete Phase 1 (London-Birmingham) on current trajectory. Resume Phase 2a (Birmingham-Crewe/Manchester) and Phase 2b (East Midlands-Leeds) on revised timeline. Conduct honest audit of what has happened with HS2 spending to date.
Phase completion
- Phase 1 (London-Birmingham): complete on current schedule, approximately 2033
- Phase 2a (Birmingham to Crewe, onward to Manchester): resumed, target completion 2040
- Phase 2b East (East Midlands hub to Leeds via Nottingham/Derby): resumed, target completion 2042
- Euston terminus: delivered properly, not staged endlessly
Delivery reform
- End consultancy-layered management structure
- Direct construction management by HS2 Ltd as executive agency
- Public reporting quarterly on cost, schedule, and scope
- No scope additions without explicit Ministerial decision and public justification
Cost: Total remaining HS2 programme ~£60bn over 15 years. Split: ~£45bn Phase 1 completion + Phase 2 build, ~£15bn rolling stock and ancillary. Capital spend, financed via dedicated transport infrastructure gilts.
Audit commitment
- Independent audit of HS2 spending to date by National Audit Office with additional external capacity
- Specific focus on: consultancy fees, property acquisition, management layers, scope changes
- Findings published, action taken where accountability is clear
- This is NOT a witch-hunt but a genuine accountability exercise: someone has made fortunes from the mess, taxpayers need to know how and why
Rail: Nationalisation Continuation and Reform.
Position: Continue rail nationalisation already in train under Labour, reform delivery so it actually works.
Mechanisms
- Great British Railways established on committed timeline
- Operating companies brought into public ownership as contracts expire (already Labour policy)
- Rolling stock: leased from ROSCOs initially, with long-term shift to public ownership
- Fares reform: simpler structure, end of the current incoherent tariff system
- Freight capacity prioritised alongside passenger: UK rail freight underdeveloped vs European peers
- Industrial strategy: UK rolling stock manufacturing (Hitachi Newton Aycliffe, Alstom Derby, Bombardier/Alstom Liverpool) protected and expanded
- Capital investment in rolling stock, electrification, signalling: £5bn/year sustained
Cost: Continues existing Labour trajectory. Additional ~£2bn/year revenue for service expansion (particularly in regions).
Bus Franchising.
Position: Bus franchising extended nationally. Public ownership option for failing routes.
Mechanism
- Franchising powers extended to all authorities that want them (currently only some Combined Authorities)
- Public ownership as backstop where commercial operators fail or are inadequate
- Rural bus network rebuilt: dedicated funding £500m/year for services that wouldn't be commercially viable but serve genuine public need
- Integration with rail and active travel
Cost: £1bn/year additional revenue.
Road Network.
Position: Maintenance and repair as priority over new building, with exceptions for genuinely strategic routes.
Mechanisms
- Local road repair backlog addressed: specific capital programme £2bn/year for 5 years for pothole elimination and resurfacing
- National Highways maintenance properly funded: end of the "reactive maintenance" crisis
- Strategic new builds only where economically justified: most Northern routes, selected bypass projects, port access roads
- No "roads for the sake of roads": end of the demand-led programming that gave us the Lower Thames Crossing at £10bn+
Cost: £2bn/year capital for 5 years (pothole programme), then reduced. £500m/year additional revenue for maintenance.
Freight and Ports.
Position: Freight infrastructure as industrial policy.
Mechanisms
- Port capacity expansion at Felixstowe, Southampton, Liverpool, Immingham, Tees (decarbonisation-linked)
- Rail freight capacity prioritised
- Inland ports network developed
- HGV workforce pipeline (skills linkage to the apprenticeships briefing)
Cost: £1bn/year capital across programme, much industry-funded.
Aviation.
Position: Regional airport investment, measured approach to expansion.
Mechanisms
- Regional airports supported: Manchester, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds Bradford, Newcastle, Bristol, East Midlands
- Heathrow third runway: decision taken on the merits, neither blocked nor fast-tracked
- Sustainable aviation fuel industry developed as industrial opportunity
- Space launch capability (Saxa Vord, Sutherland) supported as sovereign capability
Cost: £300m/year across programme.
EV Transition.
Position: Pragmatic, industry-protective, infrastructure-led.
Mechanisms
- ZEV mandate maintained but trajectory reviewed against industry capacity
- Charging infrastructure rollout accelerated via National Grid investment (links to the Energy briefing)
- UK battery production supported: Britishvolt failure not repeated; strategic backing for gigafactory capacity (Nissan Sunderland, Jaguar Somerset)
- Plug-in grant reintroduced, means-tested and UK-manufactured vehicle preference
- Heavy vehicle transition (HGV, bus, commercial) supported
- Hybrid acceptance extended: forced BEV-only transition risks UK industry
Cost: £1bn/year additional across charging, industry support, grants.
Active Travel.
Position: Modest but real investment, with planning linkage.
Mechanisms
- Cycling and walking infrastructure funding restored after recent cuts
- New housing developments required to include active travel provision as standard
- School cycling and walking routes prioritised
- E-bike subsidies for commuting
Cost: £500m/year.
Costs Summary.
Additional commitments above existing trajectory.
| Item | Y5 rev | Y5 cap | Y10 rev | Y10 cap |
|---|
| HS2 completion | — | £4bn | £0.5bn | £3bn |
| Rail service expansion | £2bn | £1bn | £2bn | £1bn |
| Bus franchising + rural | £1bn | £0.2bn | £1bn | £0.2bn |
| Road maintenance/potholes | £0.5bn | £2bn | £0.3bn | £0.5bn |
| Freight/ports | — | £1bn | — | £0.5bn |
| Aviation | £0.1bn | £0.2bn | £0.1bn | £0.2bn |
| EV transition | £0.5bn | £0.5bn | £0.3bn | £0.3bn |
| Active travel | £0.2bn | £0.3bn | £0.2bn | £0.3bn |
| TOTAL ADDITIONAL | £4.3bn | £9.2bn | £4.4bn | £6bn |
Higher than initial headline (£3bn Y5 revenue). Within tolerance but worth noting.
Strategic Framing.
On HS2: "We started this project. We will finish it properly. And we will find out what happened with the money that has already been spent. The North deserves the link it was promised. The country deserves to know how £60bn became £100bn. Both will happen."
On transport generally: "Buses restored. Trains properly run. Roads properly maintained. Ports and freight that actually work. Transport is industrial policy, housing policy, and regional policy all at once. We will treat it seriously."
On EVs: "We support the transition but we will not sacrifice British auto industry to arbitrary timelines. Nissan Sunderland, Jaguar Land Rover, Mini, Toyota, Honda — these firms employ hundreds of thousands. The transition will work for them, not against them."